My thesis explores the possibility that the wrongful intentions principle might not apply in certain deterrent situations. WIP states that if it is wrong to do something under certain conditions, it is wrong to intend to do it should those conditions arise. Questions about applications of WIP are frequently raised in discussions about the morality of nuclear deterrence. Some philosophers, such as Gregory Kavka, maintain that in certain situations where gaining deterrence is important, it is morally permissible, and perhaps even (...) obligatory to form a sincere intention to retaliate although retaliation is wrong. ;The rejection of WIP causes paradoxes about relationships between good agents and right actions. Good and rational agents are unable to fulfill obligations to intend wrong, as their unwillingness to do wrong makes intending it impossible. Hence, the paradoxical conclusion that only a corrupt individual can do right in certain situations. ;The conclusion that in certain situations only corrupt agents can do right rests upon rejecting the WIP. I show that WIP applies in all deterrence situations and in all situations, period. Because WIP always applies, there are no situations where goodness and rationality prevent right action. ;Chapter one presents consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments to the conclusion that actual retaliation against civilian populations is wrong. In chapters two and three I argue that the kinds of situations discussed by Kavka and others doesn't warrant rejecting WIP. I maintain that non-consequentialist theories cannot permit agents to separate questions about intentions from questions about actions. Consequentialism cannot justify rejecting WIP in these situations either. Rejection of WIP implies that a corrupt leader is needed, and consequentialism cannot justify seeking such a leader. Chapter four argues that WIP must apply in all situations because it must be part of any action-guiding theory, either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. Talk of rejecting WIP is incoherent. Hence, because WIP always applies, goodness and rationality will never preclude right action, and whenever performing an action is wrong, intending to perform it is wrong as well. (shrink)

Smith et al. present a model that they suggest may clarify aspects of the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition, based on observation of what they call uncertainty monitoring. Although they suggest that their model is supported by data collected using monkeys and dolphins, their interpretation that nonhuman animal behaviors parallel thought processes in humans may be unwarranted. The model presented by Smith et al. is inconsistent with current theories and empirical findings on the comparative aspects of metacognition. We present three oversights (...) of the model and extend our critique to include a brief discussion of animal self-awareness, as well as current neuropsychological perspectives on metacognitive processing in humans. (shrink)

Social norm transgressions are assumed to be at the root of numerous substantial negative outcomes for transgressors. There is a prevailing notion among lay people and scholars that transgressing social norms can negatively impact one’s mental health. The present research aimed to examine this assumption, focusing on clinically relevant outcomes such as anxiety and depression. The present research further aimed to examine a social cognitive process for these outcomes in the form of fear of negative evaluations as a result of (...) one’s norm transgressing behavior. Specifically, it examined whether it is negative evaluations about ourselves or about those close to us that mediates the effect of social norm transgressions, and whether those may vary as a function of culture. Results of the present research, including a study with a community sample, suggest a positive association between social norm transgressions and psychological distress. Results also suggest that increased fear of negative evaluation mediates that association but does so differently for people from more collectivistic cultures and people from less collectivistic cultures. For people from more collectivistic cultures increased fear of negative evaluation of close others may mediate the association between social norm transgressions and psychological distress. However, for people from less collectivistic cultures that association may be mediated by increased fear of negative evaluation of oneself. Implications for research on consequences of social norm transgressions and cross-cultural differences in perceptions of such consequences are discussed as are practical implications for motivating social norm adherence and the maintenance of constructive social norms. (shrink)

Collective action processes in complex, multiple-use common-pool resources (CPRs) have only recently become a focus of study. When CPRs evolve into more complex systems, resource use by separate user groups becomes increasingly interdependent. This implies, amongst others, that the institutional framework governing resource use has to be re-negotiated to avoid adverse impacts associated with the increased access of any new stakeholders, such as overexploitation, alienation of traditional users, and inter-user conflicts. The establishment of “platforms for resource use negotiation” is a (...) way of dealing with complex natural resource management problems. Platforms arise when stakeholders perceive the same resource management problem, realize their interdependence in solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem (Röling, 1994). This article sets the scene for a discussion in this Special Issue about the potential of nested platforms for resource use negotiation in facilitating collective action in the management of complex, multiple-use CPRs. The article has five objectives. First, we define “collective action” in the context of this paper. Second, we discuss the importance of collective action in multiple-use CPRs. Third, we introduce the concept of platforms to coordinate collective action by multiple users. Fourth, we address some issues that emerge from evidence in the field regarding the role and potential of nested platforms for managing complex CPRs. Finally, we raise five discussion statements. These will form the basis for the collection of articles in this special issue. (shrink)

Online platforms like Instagram cover potentially distressing imagery with a sensitive-content screen (blurred imagery plus a content warning). Previous research suggests people typically choose to “uncover” and view screened content. In three studies, we investigated whether the presence of screens mitigates the negative emotional impact of viewing content. In Study 1, participants viewed positive and neutral images, and screens (with an option to view the negative images beneath) for a 5-minute period. In Study 2, half the participants saw a grey (...) mask in place of the typical sensitive-content screen. In addition, each image appeared for a fixed period (5 s) and participants had no option to uncover it. Study 3 was like Study 2 except half the participants saw negative images preceded by a sensitive-content screen and half saw negative images without screens. Overall, participants reported a significant increase in state anxiety and negative affect from pre-to post task when they were exposed to sensitive-content screens, whether or not they were also exposed to the negative imagery beneath. Our data suggest sensitive-content screens cause negative responses – state anxiety and negative affect – that do not translate to an emotional benefit when people view negative content. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Ce texte porte sur l'élaboration des politiques publiques à partir d'une perspective conséquentialiste basée sur les probabilités. En utilisant l'exemple de la dissuasion par la menace nucléaire, je montre que ceux qui sont véritablement dévoués à la protection de l'environnement, ceux qui se soucient véritablement du problème de l'environnement devraient refuser le conséquentialisme basé sur les probabilités sans le principe de la reconsideration, un principe que nous proposons ici pour la première fois, le principe de la reconsideration doit être (...) adopté parce que, sans lui, le conséquentialisme basé sur les probabilités pourrait justifier qu'on poursuive l'application de politiques même lorsque celles-ci se sont révélées inadéquates, et même lorsqu'elles minent elles-mêmes leurs chances de succès. On peut ainsi conclure que le principe de la reconsidération est nécessaire pour assurer le lien entre les politiques justificatrices et leur succès. ABSTRACT This paper examines the making of public policy from a probability-based consequentialist perspective. Using nuclear deterrence policies as an example, I show that those truly committed environmental protection, those who truly care about the environment should not accept probability-based consequentialism without the reconsideration principle, a principle introduced in this paper. The reconsideration principle must be accepted, because without it, probability-based consequentialism can justify continuing to act on policies even when they have failed, and even when they undermine their original goal altogether. Thus, we conclude that the reconsideration principle is neeaed to insure connection between the justification policies and their success. (shrink)

This essay explores the American Girl Just Like You doll through a variety of feminist lenses. It was inspired by my experiences chaperoning my friend Grace to the American Girl Store in New York City, and returning to the store to shop for my own doll. I returned to the store because I was not sure why I was so extremely disturbed by this doll. The doll is not emaciated, not overtly sexy, and marketed along with outfits that supposedly send (...) girls the message that they can achieve their goals. She comes in a variety of skin, eye, and hair colors, and the line is therefore marketed as racially and ethnically sensitive. I argue that although the Just Like You line appears to be empowering and racially sensitive on a superficial level, an in-depth feminist analysis indicates that it is not. In fact, the Just Like You line is highly problematic from a feminist perspective. (shrink)

The author discusses Claudia Card's life work in that it concerns character development under heteronormative patriarchy as pertaining to the American Girl Just Like You doll. American Girl advertises this doll as a doll that can help little girls feel strong, powerful, unique, and ready to take on the world. The word "feminist" is not used in any of the company's marketing, but the company is clearly trying to market the idea that the Just Like You line is empowering for (...) girls. The author argues that the Just Like You doll discourages learning the skills that are required for world traveling, and that it also implies that such skills are not important. In order to successfully engage in cross‐cultural world traveling, one must leave arrogant perception behind and begin to understand how the other sees himself or herself as a subject in that world. (shrink)

I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attachments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too high.

Research has shown high levels of housing precarity among government-assisted refugees connected to difficult housing markets, limited social benefits, and other social and structural barriers to positive settlement. The COVID-19 pandemic has likely exacerbated this precarity. Research to date demonstrates the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for refugees and low-income households, including both health-related issues and economic challenges, that may exacerbate their ability to obtain affordable, suitable housing. In this context, we examined Syrian government-assisted refugees’ experiences during the pandemic, (...) asking: how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted Syrian refugees’ experiences of housing stability. To examine this issue, we interviewed 38 families in Calgary, London, and Fredericton. Using a qualitative descriptive methodology for analysis and interpretation, we found the liminality of settling as a GAR has been compounded by isolation, further economic loss, and new anxieties during the pandemic. Ultimately, for many participants, the pandemic has thwarted their housing stability goals and decreased their likelihood of improving their housing conditions. Based on our findings, we discuss potential policy and practice relevant solutions to the challenges faced by refugees in Canada during the pandemic and likely beyond. (shrink)

Self‐renewal and differentiation of stem cells are tightly regulated processes subject to intrinsic and extrinsic signals. Molecular chaperones and co‐chaperones, especially heat shock proteins (Hsp), are ubiquitous molecules involved in the modulation of protein conformational and complexation states. The function of Hsp, which are typically associated with stress response and tolerance, is well characterized in differentiated cells, while their role in stem cells remains unclear. It appears that embryonic stem cells exhibit increased stress tolerance and concomitant high levels of chaperone (...) expression. This review critically evaluates stem cell research from a molecular chaperone perspective. Furthermore, we propose a model of chaperone‐modulated self‐renewal in mouse embryonic stem cells. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are "mini-wars" which encourage hatred; (2) while not "mini-wars," competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some (...) competition may be useful. (shrink)

Warning research participants and patients about potential risks associated with participation/treatment is a fundamental part of consent. However, such risk warnings might cause negative expectations and subsequent nocebo effects (i.e., negative expectations cause negative outcomes) in participants. Because no existing review documents how past research has quantitatively examined nocebo effects – and negative expectations – arising from consent risk warnings, we conducted a pre-registered scoping review (N = 9). We identified several methodological issues across these studies, which in addition to (...) mixed findings, limit conclusions about whether risk warnings cause nocebo effects. (shrink)

Biocentric individualism, the position that all life has intrinsic value, is of no practical help in policy-making contexts. Examples commonly used in discussions of biocentric individualism are themselves alienating and threaten to make environmental philosophy appear irrelevant to policy decisions. Hence, both biocentric individualism and typical discussions of it are problematic for those wishing to make environmental philosophy useful in policy. A recent article by Jason Kawall, in which he attempts to defend biocentric individualism, demonstrates these points.

Biocentric individualism, the position that all life has intrinsic value, is of no practical help in policy-making contexts. Examples commonly used in discussions of biocentric individualism are themselves alienating and threaten to make environmental philosophy appear irrelevant to policy decisions. Hence, both biocentric individualism and typical discussions of it are problematic for those wishing to make environmental philosophy useful in policy. A recent article by Jason Kawall, in which he attempts to defend biocentric individualism, demonstrates these points.

This chapter contains sections titled: Historical connections Value dualisms and the logic of domination Ecofeminism and animals Environmental racism Ecofeminism and critiques of development Charges of essentialism Mainstream approaches Social ecology and deep ecology Some future hopes for ecofeminism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future of Environmental PhilosophyVictoria Davion (bio)I agree with Baird Callicott that we still see many suggestions that we can deal with problems such as global climate change individually and voluntarily, and that this is hopelessly naïve. Obviously, many people aren't even in a position to think about these issues, as daily survival is a problem. Hence, proclamations such as those in the most recent version of the Earth (...) Charter (www.earthcharter.org), stating ideas such that we are all responsible for the future of our planet, and that we all belong to one human family are hopeless and useless. However, this leaves open the question of how to deal with serious issues such as global climate change. Baird is right we need to deal with issues of scale.This brings me to some of the things that Bryan Norton and Bill Throop have mentioned. Bryan suggests that the fact that environmental ethicists have been too focused on metaphysical foundations of environmental values and have not focused enough on concrete empirical issues. I agree with Bryan here. However, Baird's concern with how we are going to understand issues of scale necessary to deal with problems such as global climate change seems to bring us back to the need for a focus on metaphysical foundations of environmental values. Hence, I am having trouble with Bill's idea that we can somehow split the labor between those who are involved with more concrete issues and those involved with issues of metaphysical foundational value. And, I am worried about what these more applied environmental ethicists will bring to the table, if they aren't well grounded in philosophical traditions.I agree with Bill that this places a great burden on students of environmental [End Page 149] philosophy, but I am not sure how to get around this burden. This brings me to Clare Palmer's comments. It is still true that many mainstream programs believe that environmental philosophy is simply second-string. It is important that undergraduates have a course available, but that's about it. She is right to point out that in the days of Leiter, we need to have plenty of up-to-date information available for those who might be interested in environmental philosophy. However, I believe they will certainly need a strong grounding in the history of philosophy in order to be at all successful in academic philosophy, or particularly useful in collaboration on interdisciplinary projects. This will also require field training as several of our contributors point out. Again, I realize this places an increased burden on students, but I see no way around it.Victoria Davion Victoria Davion is head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Georgia. She is founding and current editor of Ethics & the Environment. Her research areas include feminist philosophy, environmental ethics, ethics, and political philosophy. E-mail: [email protected] © 2007 Indiana University Press... (shrink)

: In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an "intuition" that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is "unnatural" rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is "natural," an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called "natural" in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such (...) appeals. (shrink)

In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an “intuition” that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is “unnatural” rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is “natural,” an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called “natural” in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.

In this essay, Davion argues that many arguments appealing to an “intuition” that reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is “unnatural” rely upon an underlying moral assumption that only heterosexuality is “natural,” an assumption that grounds extreme homophobia in America. Therefore, critics of cloning who are in favor of gay and lesbian equality have reasons to avoid prescriptive appeals to the so-called “natural” in making their arguments. Davion then suggests anticloning arguments that do not make such appeals.